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This project examines how Soviet military thought has influenced present                   
day Russian military doctrine and has evolved to include cyber warfare as                       
part of the larger structure of Russian information warfare. The analysis of                       
three case studies of Russian cyber activity, the attack on Estonia (2007),                       
the Russian-Georgian war (2008) and the ongoing Ukrainian war (beginning                   
2014), demonstrates the continuity of military doctrine and the physical                   
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The famous military strategist and thinker Carl von Clausewitz once stated that “usually                         
before we have learnt what danger really is, we form an idea of it which is rather more attractive                                     
than repulsive.” Back in 2012, the world community began flirting with cyber, viewing it as a                               1
new form of conducting warfare between states. In 2012, the United States, in collaboration with                             
Israel, was responsible for the infamous Stuxnet attack, or “Operation Olympic Games,” on                         
Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment facility. Dubbed as “Year One” by cyber expert and author                           2
Adam Segal, the year 2012 is now perceived as the starting point of international engagement in                               
the realm of cyberspace. This classified attack, implemented with great precision and intensive                         
planning, was designed to cause damage to the enrichment facility, as well as to disrupt the                               
development of Iran’s nuclear program. The physical consequences of the attack were massive,                         
as more than 1,000 Iranian centrifuges were damaged. In addition, the malware, or malicious                           3
software, used in the attack spread to more than a hundred countries across the world. Although                               4
cyber had been employed by states on a subdued level since the 1990s, no one can deny that this                                     5
was the first time such a massive attack was administered by a country in which physical damage                                 
was caused to an adversary’s infrastructure.   
Five years earlier, in 2007, tensions had risen between the ethnic Russian population of                           




4 “ Malicious software is any software that gives partial to full control of your computer to do whatever the malware                                       
creator wants. Malware can be a virus, worm, trojan, adware, spyware, root kit, etc. The damage done can vary from                                       
something slight as changing the author's name on a document to full control of your machine without your ability to                                       
easily find out. Most malware requires the user to initiate it's operation. Some vectors of attack include attachments                                   






the capital city of Tallinn, after the newly elected conservative Estonian government called for                           
the removal of the statue. The ethnic Russian population voiced concerns over the removal, to                             
which the Kremlin responded condemning the Estonian government for infringing upon the                       
rights of the local ethnic Russian population. The “Bronze Night” protests took place between                           
April 26th to April 29th in 2007 as response to the statue’s removal, erupting in riots. The                                 
botnets (or previously hacked computers that have the ability to send out information,                         
overwhelming an internet server) aided in administering and carrying out the DDoS, or                         
distributed denial­of­service attack. As a result, a series of DDoS attacks targeted multiple                         
government websites, including those of the Estonian parliament, the defense minister, and major                         
universities and national newspapers. As one of the most connected and technologically                       
advanced countries in the world, Estonia in 2007, relied almost entirely on the internet for daily                               
communication and functioning of the state. Estonia became paralyzed for an extended period of                           
time, even after the initial attack. This was the first time a state used offensive tactics in the cyber                                     
realm to change the actions of another country. Instead of the Stuxnet operation, it is the attack                                 
on Estonia in 2007 which should be regarded as “Year One.” This attack set the precedent that if                                   
it was successful in Estonia, the most technologically advanced country in the world ­­ it could                               
be successful  anywhere. 
Scholars and experts alike have had to familiarize themselves with cyber as a new way of                               
understanding war in the twentieth century, including direct cyber attacks such as Stuxnet, but                           
not necessarily defining it as an entirely new form of warfare. Mark Galeotti, from the Center for                                 
Global Affairs at New York University, argues that cyber warfare is not necessarily a new form                               




social and technological spheres are all constantly in flux. Michael Connell and Sarah Vogler                           6
emphasize that cyber cannot fit into a “one­size­fits­all definition,” highlighting that since cyber                         
can be implemented in a variety of ways, it also adds to the complexity of the issues treated in                                     
the literature on cyber. Maness and Valeriano suggest that instead of conceptualizing cyber as a                             
separate form of warfare, it should be thought of as a tactic used in furthering foreign policy.                                 7
James Wirtz writes that the cyber realm often feels disconnected from the larger geopolitical                           
framework due to the stigma that enshrouds cyber, especially following high profile cyber                         
attacks such as Stuxnet. Although a basic knowledge of the issues surrounding cyber is                           
necessary, for the purposes of this paper the specific literature on Russia’s use of cyber is more                                 
crucial.  
The literature on Russia’s use of cyber generally agrees that Russia’s goal is to be able to                                 
defeat the enemy without having to fire a shot. The Russian government uses information and                             
cyber warfare as a way of “preparing the battlespace,” with the intent to have total control of the                                   8
information space, which becomes critical in times of conflict. Such a system of information                           
control allows for the state to be consistently prepared in times of peace and war alike. Jānis                                 
Bērziņš, of the National Defense Academy of Latvia, asserts that in analyzing Russia’s use of                             
cyber it is to noteworthy that the most important battlespace, in the Kremlin’s point of view, is of                                   
that of the mind. In the future, information and psychological warfare are to take precedence in                               
“depressing” the enemy from within, thereby minimizing the need for deploying hard military                         








element in their broader use of information warfare, which means that the state is not only able to                                   
“justify its actions in the eyes of the public,” but as Wirtz also points out, to be able to dominate                                       10
the information landscape in any conflict and be able to control the discourse on both sides.                               11
Nikolas Gvosdev, author of  Cyberspace and National Security: Threats, Opportunities, and                     
Power in a Virtual World , states that what Russia excels at is the ability to implement                               
characteristically unsophisticated cyber attacks in a sophisticated fashion.  12
In view of the existing literature considering Russia’s use of cyber warfare to be a part of                                 
its larger infrastructure of information warfare, in this paper I will attempt to answer the                             
question: Is Russia’s use of cyber warfare a new form of warfare, or is it an extension of past                                     
Soviet doctrine? Specifically, can we trace Russian cyber warfare to Soviet asymmetric and                         
hybrid methods dating back to before the Cold­War? In answering this question, I will analyze                             
Soviet military strategy and present day Russian military doctrine, focusing in particular on the                           
case studies of Russian intervention in Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine to show that Russia still                             
draws upon former Soviet doctrine in its cyber strategy. I intend to argue that Russia’s use of                                 
cyber warfare in the information space is in fact a direct product of the continuity between Soviet                                 
and Russian military doctrine, thereby confirming the idea that while the West was still trying to                               
frame cyber within a broader understanding of warfare in the twentieth century, the Russian                           
Federation had already experimented with cyber during the 2007 cyberattacks on Estonia, and                         








In laying out my argument, the first chapter will begin by exploring the inception of                             
Soviet military thought. What concepts and ideas were the driving forces behind the formation of                             
Soviet strategy? Specifically, I will look at the role of the offense­defense balance and the                             
struggle the Soviets had in maintaining such a balance in their early doctrine, the effects of which                                 
are still to be felt in the present doctrine but subsequently allowed for cyber to be integrated into                                   
Russian grand strategy. I will ask, how did Soviet strategy ultimately lead to the formation of                               
modern Russian military strategy? What about Soviet strategy lent itself to incorporating cyber                         
under the umbrella term of information warfare in the Russian military doctrine of today?                           
Furthermore, how do the 2010 and 2014 Russian military doctrines differ in their language                           
regarding information warfare? Do the differences in doctrine coincide with the events in Estonia                           
and Georgia? How did these attacks help shape the 2014 doctrine, which will be in effect until                                 
2020?  
In chapter two, I will continue to examine the questions posed in Chapter One, but in the                                   
context of the three case studies of Russian intervention in Estonia in 2007, the                           
Russian­Georgian war in 2008, and finally the annexation of Crimea and subsequent military                         
conflict and war in Eastern Ukraine. In each of the cases, I will outline the basic background                                 
information, the events of the attack, including the form of cyber attacks implemented, most                           
importantly the DDoS or denial­of­service attacks that are seen across the board in each of the                               
three cases and finally the implications of the attacks. How has Russia conceived of the different                               
forms of cyber to its advantage? I will continue to look for evidence of continuity between the                                 
Soviet and Russian military strategies, while also looking for continuity of strategy between the                           




counter­ response. If Stuxnet is not, in fact, “Year One” as I contend, then how did the cyber                                   
attacks in Estonia help Russia reformulate its cyber doctrine and capabilities, and does the first                             
attack on Estonia help us understand the successive attacks in Georgia and Ukraine? In addition,                             
how did the amalgamation of asymmetric and hybrid methods first present itself in the                           
Russian­Georgian war and again in the Ukrainian war? How do Russia’s capabilities compare to                           
the rest of the world, notably its two largest rivals, the United States and China? In exploring                                 
these questions, I hope to be able to definitively say whether Russia’s use of cyber warfare, in the                                   
larger context of information warfare, is an extension of Soviet military strategy.  
The study of Russia’s use and implementation of cyber warfare as part of its modern                             
military doctrine is important in trying to understand the multifaceted nature of cyber and reach                             
an internationally agreed upon definition. More importantly, although Russia cannot stand for all                         
authoritarian­leaning states, this thesis sheds light upon how the nature of cyber lends itself to                             
flipping the traditional offense­defense balance, which assumes that the larger, more powerful,                       
state is more likely to go on the offensive in an effort to take as much territory as possible.                                     
Instead, a state like Russia, which is not as powerful as its rivals the United States and China, can                                     
in fact engage in offensive strategic tactics to influence and alter the behavior of vulnerable,                             
small, defense­driven states such as the border states of the Western alliance. Such an analysis                             
allows us to understand how cyber plays a role in the offense­defense balance and, eventually,                             
how cyber fits into the larger context of asymmetric and hybrid tactics.  
Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has strived to regain and maintain its foothold as                                 
an important actor on the world stage. While the Cold War ended in the eyes of the world on                                     




republics fell with the official collapse of the Soviet Union towards the end of 1991, the Cold                                 
War, one could speculate, did not end for everyone. Garry Kasparov , in 2015 published  Winter                             13
is Coming: Why Vladimir Putin and the Enemies of the Free World Must be Stopped . He reflects                                 
on the fall of the Soviet Union from the perspective of someone who is a direct byproduct of the                                     
Soviet Union; having love for his country, yet challenged by deep reservations and provocative                           
opinions about the present day Russian government and the decision­making of the West, led by                             
the United States. Instead of focusing on the multipolar world that developed in the post­Cold                             
War period, Kasparov highlights its faults in strategically addressing the shift in power after the                             
fall of the Soviet Union:  
...the winners were left without a sense of purpose and without a common foe to unite against.                                 
The enemies of the free world have no such doubts. They still define themselves by their                               
opposition to the principles and policies of liberal democracy and human rights, of which they see                               
the United States as the primary symbolic and material representative.  14
While the West and the United States enjoyed their sweet victory over communism, the losers, or                               
enemies of the free world, did not lose sight of their own positioning against the liberal and                                 
democratic values of the West. The euphoria of conquering evil felt real in the dismantling of                               
oppression embodied in the fall of the Berlin Wall, but it did not mean that evil would just                                   
disappear. Kasparov writes his book in the context of criticizing Putin’s regime and as a                             15
warning to the West, describing Putin’s relatively swift rise to power and consolidation of that                             








took following the Cold War, which also influenced the subsequent framing of its modern                           
military strategy and helps to understand its actions taken against Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine.                           
My goal is not to draw upon Kasparov from a purely academic perspective, but to use his voice                                   
of reason throughout my argument in an attempt to understand how the tumultuous political                           
atmosphere following the end of the Cold War had just as much influence in forming Russian                               























The Continuity of Soviet and Russian Military Thought 
 
In order to make sense of how Russian military strategy has evolved into its present form,                               
one has to start by examining the history of Soviet military strategy. In this chapter we will                                 
examine the outset of Soviet military thought considering the concepts and ideas that became the                             
driving forces behind Soviet strategy. Especially in regards to the hard fought effort to balance                             
both the offense and defense, principally analyzing the language in relation to information                         
(cyber) warfare and how do these discrepancies shed light upon Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in                               
2008 and ultimately begin to understand the continuum between Soviet and Russian military                         
strategies.   
Carl von Clausewitz, Prussian general and military theorist of the 18th century,                       
influenced Soviet military leaders as well as future leaders of Russia. Clausewitz viewed the                           
mobilization of the entire country for the good of the state, in both peace and war, as a necessity.                                     
As a result, the state would be able to protect its interests while also maintaining support and                                 
justification for its actions. The fact that Russian and Soviet strategists alike have drawn upon                             
social mobilization to strengthen the state in preparation for war already points to continuity                           
between Soviet and Russian military strategy. Byron Dexter, a reporter for the  Atlanta Journal in                             
the 1920s and Assistant Editor of  Foreign Affairs magazine in the 1940s and 1950s, wrote in his                                 
article “Clausewitz and Soviet Strategy ,” that Clausewitz’ theories have been formative for                       
Russian and Soviet military thought throughout the 20th century. In his examination of                         
Clausewitz, Dexter discusses aspects of war in relation to social life and how war is essentially                               




act of social life,” it can also be regarded as a “political instrument.” One can posit that the way                                     16
in which Russia views the nature of its cyber operations also has its basis in the theoretical ideas                                   
of Clausewitz, who promoted the theory of ‘unified war', which grew out of the idea of                               
mobilizing the whole state, “directed by a supreme intelligence, in which political and military                           
instruments are used indifferently to suit a particular object in the pursuit of a gigantic plan.”                               17
While here Clausewitz is referencing the ‘peace offensive,’ this same idea can be applied to                             
Russia’s utilization and weaponization of information warfare. Under the Russian Federation,                     
pursuing ‘unified war’ could now be seen as including information warfare, which is ultimately                           
the ‘gigantic plan,” but which Clausewitz could not have predicted at the time.  
Boris Shaposhnikov, a former Soviet military commander, Chief of Staff of the Red                         
Army and Marshal of the Soviet Union, whose book  The Brain of the Army famously sat on                                 
Stalin’s desk, adopted many of Clausewitz’ theories in the development of Russian military                         
strategy and also influenced future leaders of Russia. Clausewitz’ theory often aligned with                         
Marxist ideology, acknowledging a connection between war and politics as reliant on one                         
another for their success and effectiveness. Though Lenin did not become a Clausewitzian                         18
scholar, fact of the matter is that he was able to read Clausewitzian theory from his perspective as                                   
a politician, as Dexter writes, rather than as a “military man,” is key in talking about Russia’s                                 
role in information warfare today. Beginning with Lenin, Russian military thinkers were able to                           
conceive of politics, war and social life on the same plane. From the perspective of Dexter, this                                 
feature was unique to the Soviet, and now Russian, strategy: the ability to implement “a strategy                               







for the attainment of a clear and overriding goal.” Although a ‘unified war’ may not have                             19
included cyber war in the eyes of Clausewitz in the 18th century or in the eyes of Lenin or Stalin                                       
in the 20th century, it is clear that the creation of cyber as a tool or instrument for facilitating this                                       
grand plan of ‘unified war’ has only aided Russia.  
Soviet military strategy devised as a result of the Bolshevik October Revolution of 1917                           
initially had the goal of expanding the revolution beyond the borders of the Soviet Union.                             
Revolution would spark uprisings in the capitalist states, which in turn would lead these                           
capitalist societies to embrace socialism. The Bolsheviks quickly realized this ambitious goal of                         
waging a worldwide revolution was unattainable, alternatively resorting to protecting the                     
revolution inside the borders of the newly formed Soviet Union. In the spirit of socialist                             
ideology, the Bolsheviks set out to organize an entire army comprised only of volunteers, which                             
would later become the infamous Red Army. In her book  Makers of Modern Strategy from                             
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age , Condoleezza Rice writes that this decision to protect the                           
revolution within the borders of the Soviet Union was the most important decision the                           
Bolsheviks made in the development of Soviet military strategy.  20
In the formative years of the Soviet military, three main strategists arose to prominence:                           
Mikhail Tukhachevsky, formerly a junior lieutenant in the imperial army, who held an imperial                           
and Bolshevik perspective on war; Leon Trotsky, a Russian revolutionary, well­known theorist of                         
Marxism and at the time the commissar of foreign affairs and war; and Mikhail Frunze, a                               21







during the Civil War. Each one made contributions to the formulation of Soviet strategy that have                               
had a lasting effect on both Soviet and Russian military thought. 
____ 
Concepts and Ideas as Driving Forces of Soviet Strategy   
Each of the original framers of Soviet strategy contributed vastly different perspectives to                         
the development of Soviet doctrine. As a result, although the doctrine may be considered to be                               
sophisticated, it contains concepts that could be viewed as contradictory or underdeveloped.                       
Mikhail Frunze drew upon the traditional values of peasant culture as well as on the                             
revolutionary values of the proletariat. The reality of peasant life and proletarian life shared                           
characteristics with partisan or irregular warfare; the peasant had no ownership of the land and                             
was used to cultivating it with a limited amount of resources, while the insurgent nature of the                                 
proletariat accustomed it to asymmetric conflict. Frunze allied the mind of the peasant with the                             
mind of the proletarian, and in that way envisioned combining partisan warfare with an offensive                             
strategy.   22
Frunze never had the opportunity to explain how offensive strategic thinking was to be                           
implemented in the Soviet system, never specifically “clarifying whether the political offensive                       
or the military strategy of the offensive was at the core of his argument.” This vagueness still                                 23
exists in the offense­defense balance of Russian military strategy and thought today, where the                           
political doctrine is defensive while its military strategy is offensive. Therefore, the                       
implementation of cyber into modern doctrine has been relatively seamless, because as Rebecca                         






offense­defense theory, technology is perceived as favoring the offense, it has therefore been                         24
natural for Russia to continue along the path of pursuing the offensive strategy through the use of                                 
cyber. An examination of the offense­defense balance of Russia would be the subject for another                             
study, yet it is important to mention it here in order to understand how Russia has come to                                   
implement cyber as a part of its grand strategy.   
Although Frunze wanted to work towards perfecting a strategy that would result in the                           
formation of a “mass army,” he also grudgingly understood the importance of accepting                         25
technological advancement for the development of future warfare. In order for the diplomatic,                         
economic, and military sectors to function in a coordinated manner, knowledge alone would not                           
be enough, as Trotsky argued, but also required a skill set, preparedness and the willingness to                               
accept developments in military science. These ideas supported by Frunze were in fact originally                           
put forth by Tukhachevsky.    26
Mikhail Tukhachevsky and Boris Shaposhnikov, a Soviet military commander, Chief of                       
Staff of the Red Army and Marshal of the Soviet Union, understood the value of having the                                 
support of the entire country as validation and justification of state actions in times of war and in                                   
times of peace; if worldwide revolution was not possible, then the future of socialism and the                               
safety of the Union lay in the hands of the proletariat and the peasant. Learning from its failures                                   
during the Civil War, the Soviet government mobilized the economic system to protect and                           
support the interests of the military, highlighting the importance of communication as a useful                           









sciences, has come to fruition in present day Russian strategy as we see the fields of                               
communications and military science collide in the cyber realm. 
Before World War II, the Soviet Union had a significant military collaboration with                         
Germany to develop the Red Army in logistical terms. Collaborating with a foreign army                           
allowed for the Red Army to overcome its problem of depleted resources. Missing from Rice’s                             
account is the significant economic reason for this collaboration on the part of the Red Army.                               
During the time of the collaboration, the Soviet Union was undergoing massive economic                         
development through the implementation of the New Economic Policy between 1921 and 1928                         
imposed by Lenin. The policy represented a temporary loosening of the extreme centralization                         
characteristic of wartime communism, and was subsequently replaced with Stalinism, which                     
drove the country into a period of intense industrialization, surpassing the achievements of                         
Germany.   27
This understanding of the necessity and importance of technology was not specific to                         
Frunze but was widely accepted, lasting into the Cold War Era. James J. Wirtz writes in  Cyber                                 
War and Strategic Culture: The Russian Integration of Cyber Power into Grand Strategy  that                           
what Russians have generally lacked in technological expertise and innovation, they make up for                           
“in their ability to foresee the broad impact of technology on the battlespace.” In Frunze’s time,                               
the early Soviets were still trying to conceive of how to organize an effective army rather than                                 
focusing on technological development and innovation. This decision is definitely felt later                       





cyber espionage in an effort to obtain Western scientific, technical and military intelligence and                           
be able to to compete, or as Wirtz writes, to “keep pace with more sophisticated and innovative 
opponents,” and in that way they were able to overcome the lack of technological advancement                             
offensively.  28
Leon Trotsky, whose own form of Marxism has been coined Trotskyism, did not believe                           
in a centralized doctrine as Frunze, but his ideas did not stray far from the offensive. While                                 
Trotsky and Frunze clashed over the idea of a formulated doctrine for the Red Army, both valued                                 
the importance of preparedness for military success. Trotsky once said that the only doctrine                           
needed was to “be on the alert and keep your eyes open.” More seriously, Trotsky argued that a                                   
formulated doctrine would “not only improperly formulate general goals, strategy, and tactics”                       
but also “divert attention from most practical and vital tasks” The Trotsky­Frunze debate                         29
became formative in the development of Soviet strategy in the following years. Ultimately,                         
Frunze’s argument of a centralized doctrine triumphed over Trotsky’s of a loose uncentralized                         
doctrine focused rather on skill, but the weakness of Frunze’s argument, who never clarified if                             
the offensive should take precedence over the political, or was only meant to be applied in the                                 
event of war, is still felt in Russian military thinking today. 
While the Bolsheviks had wanted to create a worldwide revolution to promote                       
communist ideology, Trotsky recognized the ‘slippery slope’ of creating a worldwide system of                         
militarization to protect and benefit that revolution, (clearly in line with Marx’s original vision).                           
As Rice briefly notes herself, it could be argued that present day Russia has fallen into this trap                                   






interest of the Russian state at all costs, and the way in which Putin has maintained his grip over                                     
Russia for the majority of the 2000s and 2010s, shows how a form of hybrid authoritarian power                                 
has usurped the legitimate mechanisms of the Federation. The anxieties first expressed by                         
Trotsky have now become a reality for the Russian people, with the government giving the                             
impression that the country is truly “encircled by hostile powers,” thus instilling the “fear of                             
internal enemies,” into the minds of the citizens. These fears were then exacerbated and                           30
emphasized by the 2008 economic recession, allowing the Kremlin and the Russian society more                           
cause to feel undermined by the West.  
The fear and paranoia over how to protect the integrity of the Union was not specific to                                 
Trotsky alone but also became a supreme concern under Stalin. Rice implies in her account that                               
Stalinist military thinking combined with “Stalin’s infallibility” made it difficult for Soviet                       
military thought to progress. While Rice calls it “Stalin’s infallibility,” it would be more correct                             31
to say that Stalin had a strong personal belief in his own infallibility. Stalin decided that officers                                 
and commanders loyal to Germany were to be deemed untrustworthy of the Soviet Union and                             
therefore ‘eliminated.’ Crucial military thinkers, among them Tukhachevsky, were executed                   
during the purge, and those who survived were silenced. As a result, the Red Army faced a                                 
massive challenge with the loss of so many excellent military minds, therefore Soviet military                           
thought stagnated and was overshadowed by Stalinism. Soviet military history at this juncture                         
should be stressed because it solidified Russia’s drive towards the offensive based on the fear and                               
paranoia conceived by Trotsky and achieved by Stalin through the purges. As a result, in lieu of                                 






the fear and paranoia was directed inwardly and became a detriment to Soviet goals instead. This                               
offensive strategy driven by fear must be taken into account in regard to Russia’s use of cyber                                 
today.  
Unable to keep pace with Stalin’s chokehold over Soviet military thinking, and together                         
with the inability to define Frunze’s vague argument about the offense­defense balance, the                         
underdeveloped character of Soviet strategic thinking became more apparent during the Winter                       
War waged against Finland from 1939­1940, in which the Red Army won, but left with heavy                               
losses in numbers. Stalin became a threat to the state he so wished to protect because of his own                                     
obsession with loyalty to the Union and maintaining his own power. The Molotov­Ribbentrop                         
Pact of 1939 was key for Stalin in the interest of saving time and enabling the Soviet Union to                                     
situate itself militarily. The infamous pact determined on paper how the Russian and German                           
spheres of influence could peacefully coexist, but in turn placed the futures of Poland, Finland                             
and the Baltic States in jeopardy, which is important for our discussion of the three case studies                                 32
discussed in the next chapter. The way the Soviets ultimately won the war was through the                               
effective mobilization of the Soviet state. In addition, they were able to draw upon the hidden                               
strength of their vast expanse of territory. The Red Army struggled over the course of the war,                                 33
but their tactics improved as the army’s adaptability aided the army effectively even when                           
resources were scarce.   34
After 1942, more attention was paid to the importance of defense, though offense                         
continued to be regarded as the main form of combat. The Soviets tried to reimagine defense as a                                   







once they had improved upon their defensive strategy, they could finally employ their offensive                           
strategy more effectively and with more confidence. This reimagination of Soviet strategy                       35
became crucial in developing Russia’s cyber capabilities in the 21st century, by virtue of the fact                               
that the cyberspace has allowed Russia to maintain the offense as their predominant form of                             
strategy, while also flexing their defensive muscle allowing for increased mobility. What the                         
Soviets ultimately learned in World War II was the importance of defense ­­ an army cannot have                                 
an effective offense without an effective defense to rely on. They were able to reconfigure after                               
the first half of the war and adjust their strategy temporarily, in accordance with the changing                               
battlefield. These adjustments to strategy were only successful due to the support and                         
mobilization of the entire Soviet state.   36
Moving forward, the roles of the offense­defense balance, mobilization of the state, and                         
the peasant and proletariat as a the motivation behind advancing asymmetric and hybrid methods                           
on the battlefield, where the most significant points in ultimately influencing Russian military                         
doctrine. In Terry L. Heyns’  American and Soviet Relations since Detente , he lays out the                             
intrinsic differences between both societies and political systems. In the Soviet era, technology                         
and media were perceived as only worthy when placed in the context of supporting the Soviet                               
regime, where in contrast to the United States, technology and media were used as a form of                                 
commercialization in support of the economy. As a result, the same way Russian military                           
strategy stagnated after the Stalin’s military purges, the Soviet hesitation of accepting                       
technological advancements during the Cold War (minus the Space Race with the United States,                           






Tukhachevsky and Frunze alike, fundamental to Soviet military thought, had stressed the                       
importance of accepting technological development as Soviet military strategy. This may explain                       
why Russia’s cyber capabilities had not been fully developed up until Estonia, because the West                             
assumed that such capabilities were not possible in regards to a state that has historically been                               
hesitant technological growth.   
____ 
 Russian Military Doctrine(s) 
as an Extension of Soviet Military Strategy 
Since the 2007 Estonian cyber attacks, the Georgian, the annexation of Ukraine in 2014,                           
and the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Russia has made increasingly aggressive advances on the                           
world stage to legitimize its standing while also countering the West. Amid these confrontations,                           
Russia has also been quietly maximizing its cyber capabilities and integrating these capabilities                         
into a larger structure of information warfare and strategy. Russian military thinkers have coined                           
the term “New Generation Warfare,” to describe how Russia is shifting from the battlefield of                             
traditional warfare that dominated the 20th and 21st centuries and bringing war into the cyber                             
realm in order to achieve the ultimate goal of “contactless war.” Russia’s objectives for                           37
achieving this contactless war are explored throughout the two versions of the modern doctrine,                           
published first in 2010 and then revised and republished in 2014. It is important to note that the                                   
Russian government’s list of definitions of terms such as  military security ,  threat ,  danger ,                         
military conflict and  armed conflict are all formulated to reflect the point of view of the Russian                                 





of these terms. The definitions are mostly identical between the two doctrines, other than the                             
addition of “mobilization readiness of the Russian Federation” in the 2014 doctrine:  
(l)...the ability of the Armed Forces, other troops and organs of the economy, state and federal                               
authorities, public authorities or subjects of the Russian Federation, local governments and                       
organizations to implement mobilization plans.  38
Mobilization, as stated by this clause, is not specific to the Russian government or to the military,                                 
but instead is expected of the state as a whole, reminiscent of Soviet military thought. The                               
strategy of mobilization was used in preparation for World War II in an effort to consolidate                               
depleted resources, whereas now this strategy is implemented in order to have total control of all                               
state sectors. While under Soviet strategy mobilization of the state was proposed as a strategy                             
that would hypothetically benefit the state in preparation for war, it is evident in this clause that it                                   
is the role of the military to mobilize all necessary sectors. This centralization and rallying of the                                 
state is important in relation to cyber because it means that cyber is in effect included in the                                   
strategy of total mobilization as well.  
In Connell and Vogler’s examination of  Russia’s Approach to Cyber Warfare, they                       
describe Russia as perceiving the information landscape to be a separate domain of war, which                             
allows the state to dominate this landscape both domestically and internationally. Similar to the                           
Chinese, Russians use the broader term  informatization,  rather than cyber (or  kiber ), which is                           
commonly used in reference to the West. Russians conceptualize any cyber operations as part of                             
a larger structure of information warfare or  informatsionnaya voyna .  The Military Doctrine of                         39






political objective without the use of military force, while also shaping the discourse regionally                           
and internationally in favor of the Russian Federation. The umbrella term of information warfare                           
emcompasses computer network operations, electronic warfare, psychological operations, and                 
information operations. It includes the now infamous disinformation campaigns on social media                       
during the run­up to the 2016 U.S. presidential election, as well as troll farms fueling those                               40
campaigns, together with more subversive campaigns, such as cyber attacks affecting both the                         
psychological and physical infrastructure of their adversaries, both regionally and internationally.                     
Listed within the Military Doctrine are Russia’s main tasks for deterrence and a description of                             
the military conflicts in which these information technologies are to be used as a way of                               
advancing the Federation’s relations on the global scale as well as regionally:  
information technologies are used as a way to assess and predict the development of the                             
military­political situation at the global and regional level and also the state of interstate relations                             
in the military­political sphere…   41
The inclusion of this clause alludes to the Soviet goal of minimizing the physical use of force in                                   
times of war. In the context of modern Russian strategy, shaping the discourse is achieved                             
through the use of information technologies (cyber) to monitor the general “military­political                       
situation.” As Kasparov points out, if the government has control of the so­called “fourth estate,”                             













fourth estate does not include cyber, the fact is that the information technologies, which do                             
include cyber, can be appropriated as a way of controlling the fourth estate, which in turn is                                 
manipulated to influence the discourse of society, whether at home or abroad. 
Col. S.G. Chekinov (Res.) and Lt. Gen. S.A. Bogdanov (Ret.), two Russian military                           
specialists on information operations, point to the general Russian theory of cyber operations, in                           
which information has the power to “disrupt governance, organize anti­government protests,                     
delude adversaries, influence public opinion, and reduce an opponent’s will to resist.” The                         43
clandestine nature of cyber allows for both sides of a conflict to benefit from these operations.                               
The antagonist can use cyber to achieve the goals of disruption and delusion, while at the same                                 
time the victim of the operations can organize counteractive measures using information                       
technologies, in its turn influencing public opinion and even attempting to “delude” the                         
antagonist and adversary when useful. However, it is an accepted axiom that in any cyber                             
conflict it is the side with the superior means and capabilities that will be able to dominate. As a                                     
result, the government that does have the means will attempt to maintain some level of “plausible                               
deniability,” the term used when top officials deny any responsibility for wrongdoing by                         44
lower­ranking officials, through the manipulation of information technologies. Plausible                 
deniability arises as a key issue and point of contention when addressing the role of                             
responsibility in Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine.  
Importantly, the 2010 doctrine does not identify information and communication                   







doctrine of 2014 has added information and communication technologies under “main external                       
military dangers”:  
(k) the use of information and communication technologies in the military­political purposes for                         
acts contrary to international law, aimed versus sovereignty, political independence, territorial                     
integrity of states and threatening international peace, security, global and regional stability.  45
It must be noted that the language used here, e.g., “military­political purposes,” has direct ties to                               
past Soviet military thought. Soviet military strategy, as Rice writes, could be defined as having                             
two distinct parts: on the one hand the political­military, “which attempts to define the purpose                             
and character of military power,” and on the other hand the military­technical side, “which                           
determines how Soviet military will operate in the field.” The language found in the doctrine                             46
echoes this dichotomy of the political­military versus the military­technical aims of strategy. The                         
focused use of information and communication technologies is aimed at aiding the                       
political­military side, first and foremost. The technologies, in the case of Russia, have often                           
been placed in reference to sovereign and territorial integrity, drawing upon Berzins’ conception                         
of Russian military doctrine as having two distinct parts, those being: “doctrinal unilateralism”                         
and “legalism.” Berzins writes that a legal framework which supports and above all justifies the                             47
actions of the state, also allows a role for plausible deniability. By explicitly stating that the                               
Russian government supports the use of these technologies “contrary to international law,” it is                           
clear that the Russian government implements cyber policy according to its own interpretation of                           







Ukraine; therefore according to its own interpretation of international law there was no                         
wrongdoing.  
Both the 2010 and 2014 doctrines equally outline significant features of contemporary                       
forms of warfare or conflicts crucial to the understanding what direction Russian military                         
strategy will take in the future. The first notable clause in the section outlining “characteristic                             
features of contemporary military conflicts” reads: “the integrated utilization of military force or                         
forces and resources of a non­military character,” highlighting further consolidation of the army                         48
and the use of non­military means to advance the military and political agenda. Drawing upon                             
the importance of mobilization of the military and how mobilization will continue to be                           
important going forward. This alludes to the character of cyber in which the offensive is favored,                               





Integration is affirmed even more strongly than in the 2010 doctrine, another sign that present                             
day Russian doctrine echoes Soviet military thought in drawing upon mobilization as a means of                             
supporting the military while also protecting the state. The 2014 clause is unique to this                             
document in inserting “protest potential,” echoing Soviet military thought as well. The Russian                         
state continues to value the mobilization of the people in support of state actions, another point                               






stress the integration and synchronization of information with military force, together with the                         
political and economic spheres, and other non­military measures. While, in the 2010 version, the                           
Russian government predicted information warfare could have an impact based on its experience                         
with the conflicts in Estonia and Georgia, it is clear that the revised and clarified language of the                                   
2014 document indicates that the focus on information warfare is increasing, and embodying                         
itself in the doctrine. Another important addition, the “ (i) use of indirect and asymmetric                             
methods” which are to be further explored and employed, connects to Soviet military strategic                           50
thinking as its basis, but in addition expands the doctrine to apply to present­day strategic norms                               
in order to be competitive in the 21st century. The document implies that the Federation has                               
explored these methods in the past, but with the explicit addition of information (cyber) warfare                             
and technologies into the doctrine, it can be understood that cyber warfare is seen by the Russian                                 
government as an extension of asymmetric warfare by other means. 
In addition to treating the role of mobilization, clause (c) from the 2010 version draws                             
attention to troops and resources, and the scale at which they are used in the airspace and outer                                   
space domains ­­ the document mentions only two out of four domains, the other two being land                                 
and sea. This may point to the fact that airspace and outer space at the time were a priority for                                       51
development in order to make these domains more competitive. The 2014 version clarifies the                           
clause as: “the effect on the enemy throughout the breadth of its territory simultaneously in the                               
global information space, aerospace, land, and sea.” There has been a significant shift from the                             52
2010 to the 2014 doctrine, with the latter version citing the importance of infiltrating the enemy                               







logical that this would be included in the 2014 doctrine, as the government learned from its                               
successes in Estonia, and then put its techniques again into practice in the war with Georgia, in                                 
2008, and finally in Ukraine, where the conflict began, conveniently, in 2014. This leads me to                               
believe that this clause was improved upon in order to provide support and justification for                             
Russian government actions in neighboring countries through “legalism,” as argued by Berzins.   
One of the more important clauses in the 2010 doctrine may possibly be clause (d) under                               
“the characteristic features of contemporary military conflicts,” directly addressing “the                   
intensification of the role of information warfare.” It is clear that the biggest difference between                             53
the two doctrines can be found in the two parallel sections entitled “characteristic features of                             
contemporary military conflicts” and “features of modern military conflicts” in the 2010                       
doctrine. In the 2014 doctrine, this distinction is not made: instead, the two sections are compiled                               
under the one heading “the nature and characteristics of modern warfare,” which integrates                         
information warfare throughout the clauses. It is clear from this particular clause that information                           
warfare is to be implemented (a) for achieving political objectives, (instead of using military                           
force) and simultaneously (b) to change the response of the world community towards Russia’s                           
actions and therefore minimize judgement. This demonstrates that in 2010, the Russian                       
government had a significant interest in actualizing information warfare as a part of strategy and                             
conceptualizing  how  to implement it into present day strategy. In stark contrast, the 2014                           
doctrine has completely eliminated the former clause, which has been changed to: “ (d)                           
selectively and a high degree of destruction of objects, speed maneuver and the fire, the use of                                 






highlight the mobility and destructive potential of troops, providing evidence of another                       
important shift between 2010 and 2014. Not only has information warfare been integrated into                           
several clauses in the 2014 version of the doctrine, but information warfare itself has been                             
implemented in Russian strategy and in real, physical terms in the Russian military.   
Contrary to the 2010 doctrine, the 2014 doctrine has four entirely new clauses added to                             
the end of the section addressing characteristics of modern warfare. These clauses were added                           






These four consecutive clauses directly address asymmetric and hybrid conflict with emphasis on                         
the irregularity of armed groups, territories in a state of constant conflict, the increasing role of                               
social movements involved in conflict, and, most importantly, accentuating the growing                     
importance of “indirect and asymmetric methods.” This depicts the fact that the Russian                         
government recognizes that asymmetric and irregular methods will and have already played a                         
more significant role in modern warfare.  
In listing these clauses, the document implies that the Russian government is  willing to                           
engage in asymmetric and hybrid conflict. The existence of these clauses solidify my claim that                             
Russia has always engaged in asymmetric and hybrid methods of conflict since the inception of                             





reminiscent of Frunze’s early discussion of the dichotomy between the offensive and defensive                         
characteristics of the proletarians and peasants, and the further manifestation of these                       
characteristics in Soviet strategy. The clauses are also evocative of Berzins’ argument that Russia                           
has a pattern of utilizing legalism to condone its actions. These irregular methods have a direct                               
connection to Russia’s use of offensive and defensive strategy and the development of Russia’s                           
present day cyber capabilities.  
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate the continuities between Soviet and Russian                       
approaches to warfare, with a particular emphasis on asymmetric and hybrid forms of warfare.                           
We have seen how there is a clear continuity between Soviet and Russian strategy, apart from                               
this, the differences between the 2010 and 2014 doctrines provides evidence that these                         
differences mirror the succession of events between Georgia and Ukraine specifically. In the next                           
chapter, we will focus on how Russia’s actual use of cyber has evolved since the first attack on                                   






















The post­Cold War days of a unipolar world, in which the United States dominated the                             
international power politics, is not over  per se, but definitely on the decline. The Russian                             
Federation feels threatened by the direction world development is taking, increasingly accepting                       
of nations competing for superiority on the world stage, resulting in multipolarity among states                           
on the international level.  The Military Dangers and Military Threats to the Russian Federation,                           
stresses changes in world development such that other nations are reaching for “all­embracing                         
domination” and multipolarity. However, these developments have only benefited Russia, which                     
has taken the opportunity to re­establish its circle of influence in the post­Soviet bloc. The irony                               
of it is that Russia is exactly one of the countries doing just that: attempting to compete with                                   
other world powers. While in the Soviet era, ignoring the international system worked in favor of                               
maintaining the revolution within the borders of the Union, the same strategy would not be able                               
to work in the post Cold­War era having been embraced by the West and invited to participate in                                   
the international system. In the eyes of the West, inviting the new Russian Federation to the table                                 
was a way of saying let bygones­be­bygones and hopefully by being integrated into the                           
international democratic system would enable the Federation to democratize.  
In talking about the three cases of cyber attacks in Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine and                             
returning to the contemporary Russian military doctrine, Russia views of “(e) territorial claims                         
against the Russians Federation and its allies and interference in their internal affairs” as one of                               56
their main external dangers to the Russian Federation. This clause remains unchanged in the                           





international community’s response, which returns to Berzins' point about Russia’s use of                       
legalism to justify its actions, especially internationally. Moreover, this clause also acknowledges                       
Trotsky's prediction of a Soviet Union “encircled by hostile powers and so fearful of internal                             
enemies that it would be brutally repressive,” in the event that worldwide revolution fails.                           57
Though Trotsky never clarified what he meant by 'hostile powers', I could argue that these                             
“hostile powers” in the present day are NATO and the European Union, especially in reaction to                               
Russia’s increasingly aggressive presence in the international space. This feeling of                     
reestablishing its sphere of influence has lately become a large point of contention, in which                             
Putin has tried to establish a so­called Monrosky doctrine, a sort of parody of the American                               
Monroe doctrine, of protecting the Russian sphere of influence by advocating for ethnic Russian                           
populations in much of the post­Soviet bloc. While the above clause (e) addresses Russia’s                           






The Russian government feels not only pressure from the international community and                       
institutions such as NATO and the E.U., but also from the bordering states in which Russia has                                 
interests in both their ethnic Russian base backing the Kremlin and those staunchly against the                             






incidents in Estonia and Georgia, but definitely also the conflict underway in Ukraine, at the time                               
in 2014, which has brought Russia into a negative spotlight on the world stage.  
In this chapter, we will continue to consider the questions posed in Chapter 1, yet in the                                 
context of the three cases studies of Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014). In                             
considering each of the cases, I will summarize the basic background and history, events of the                               
actual cyber attacks, as well as look at the specific types of attacks used in each of the cases.                                     
Additionally, we will continue to look for points of cohesion between Soviet and Russian                           
strategies, while also look for the continuity of mobilization, the presence of offense­defence and                           
the relationship of asymmetric and hybrid warfare in Russian strategy throughout the three cases.   
____ 
Part 1: Estonia (2007) 
Essential Background 
Following the independence of the Baltic nations, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, their                       
governments have actively worked to dismantle, displace or replace Russian and Soviet statues                         
in prominent public locations. In Latvia, already after the First World War, the statue                           
commemorating Peter the First, dating from the Russian Empire, was torn down and replaced by                             
the Freedom Monument in 1935 commemorating the Latvian troops who died in the War of                             
Independence from 1918­1920. Having survived almost 50 years of Soviet occupation, today the                         
monument still stands overlooking Old Town Riga, viewed as an important symbol of freedom                           
and prosperity and used as a point of gathering. Lithuania, too, has taken significant and                             




statues have been moved to Grutas Parkas or “Stalin World,” essentially an entire park devoted                             
to old Soviet statues.  
In early April of 2007, following the March parliamentary elections, the conservative                       
Estonian government of Prime Minister Andrus Ansip, made plans to move the controversial                         
Bronze Soldier from Tónismägi Park in central Tallinn to the remote Defense Forces Cemetery.                           
For many Baltic people, Soviet statues have represented the Soviet oppression under which they                           
lived for 50 years. On the other hand, the ethnic Russian population in Estonia viewed the                               
Bronze Soldier as a symbol of their own. The statue commemorates the Soviet liberation of                             
Estonia from the Nazis on April 30th. The Kremlin expressed that the displacement of the                             59
statue infringed on the rights of their ethnic Russians and that Estonia would pay the                             
consequences of its displacement. This increase in social tensions led to protests and riots in the                               
60
streets by the ethnic Russian population. These protests were appropriately dubbed the “Bronze                         
Night” protests. Meanwhile in Russia, a youth group demonstrated against the Estonian                       
61
ambassador and attacked the Estonian Embassy in Moscow. Most of the protests in Russia were                             
led by the government funded pro­Kremlin “Nashi su” or “Youth Movement, Ours!” Established                         
in 2005, this anti­fascism student group now has more than 100,000 members. The riots outside                             
62
the embassy did not cease until the ambassador left Russia after a deal was struck with Germany,                                 
but there have been conflicting accounts about whether the ambassador was attacked. In                         












The cyberattacks first began at 11 pm local time on Tuesday, May 8th but were alleviated                               
by 7 am the next morning. Even so, the attacks were still visible in traffic logs 30 days after the                                       
initial attack.  The attacks culminated on May 9th, which is coincidentally a symbolic day for                             
64
Russians, called May Day, a day to remember their victory over the Germans in World War II.                               
65
According to Bill Woodcock and Ross Stapleton­Gray of Packet Clearing House, a nonprofit                         
research institute for Internet traffic exchange technology, this particular time frame, together                       
with the unique signature of  botnets that were used, indicated that the perpetrators may have                             
66
been the Russian Business Network based on some of their previous spam­sending campaigns.                         
67
Woodcock and Stapleton­Gray drew the conclusion that the attack must have been a “one­month                           
attack for hire” or was made to imitate one. The attackers took down Estonian government                             
websites as part of a large DDoS (distributed denial­of­service attack).  While the DDos waged                           
68
its destruction on Estonian internet infrastructure, Vladimir Putin released his own statement in                         
response to the relocation of the Bronze Soldier: “Those who desecrate monuments to the heroes                             
of the war are insulting their own people and sowing discord and new distrust between states and                                 
people.”  
69
Among the websites affected by the attacks were those of the Estonian parliament, the                           













major universities and national newspapers. Estonia’s largest bank, Hansabank, had to                     
temporarily cease online services while 97 percent of the population, who rely solely on                           
online­banking, had no access.  In addition to the larger DDoS and botnet attacks, the                             
perpetrators also used “mail­bombing” ­­ using hacked emails to overload servers and shutdown                         
the internet. BBC reported that several websites had been defaced with images of Soviet soldiers                             
and quotes from Martin Luther King Jr. The perpetrators also used another method called “war                             
dialing,” automated phone calls directed at a company or institution, which had the effect of                             
blockading all government and parliament offices.   
70
It is important to understand that Estonia is the most wired and technologically advanced                           
society on our planet. Ninety percent of Estonians have easy access to broadband Internet and                             
nearly 100 percent of their youth population are connected to the Internet.  Estonia has the                             
71
second highest number of mobile phone subscriptions, following the United Arab Emirates. Each                         
person in Estonia owns at least one gadget ­ approximately 188.2 devices per 100 people. In                               
addition, free internet access is considered a basic human right therefore almost every feasible                           
activity is done online from live­streaming to e­voting and even e­government.  For this to be                             
72
possible, internet providers have found Estonia to be a perfect environment for an IXP or an                               
Internet exchange point. An IXP essentially connects a community of internet service providers                         
or ISPs. Some countries, such as the U.S. has more than one, Germany, on the other hand, has                                   
one large, concentrated IXP, but one city could also have multiple IXPs, such as Tallinn. Having                               
these two IXPs was largely what saved Estonia from a complete internet collapse. Estonia has                             







diplomatically aligned, and with whom Estonian ISPs have commercial relationships, such as                       
Scandinavia and Western Europe ISPs. At the time of the attack, Estonia was able to receive aid                                 
from these ISPs in neighboring countries. In addition, during the time of the attack, three                             
73
internationally renowned IT experts were visiting Estonia at the time: Kurtis Lindqvist, CEO of                           
Netnod Internet Exchange, Patrik Fältström, senior consulting engineer with Cisco and the cyber                         
security advisor for the Swedish government, and William Woodcock, research director of                       
Packet Clearing House and member of the board of directors of the American Registry of                             
Internet Numbers. Using their years of expertise, they found that the perpetrators of the attack                             
74
were likely located in Estonia.  
While this attack may not have hurt other countries to the same degree, considering the                             
connectivity of Estonia, the attack paralyzed much of the country for days. Due to the fact that                                 
most news sites were compromised, it was impossible to spread news of the attack to the outside                                 
world, which is why the event was not as widely reported. While Estonia’s internet is their                               
greatest achievement, this attack proved that Estonia’s e­system has the potential to also be its                             
downfall and weakest point.  
Implications  
There continues to be a great debate about who were the perpetrators of the attack.                             
Following the attacks, the Estonian government immediately blamed the Kremlin for funding the                         
attack but because of the nature of the attack, it was hard to place blame without sufficient                                 
evidence. The European Commission and NATO conducted their own investigations and their                       






strikes.”  They came to this conclusion even though NATO officials alleged that “the attacks                           
75
were beyond non­state actor capacities” implying that even if the Kremlin wishes to point fingers                             
at individuals to alleviate responsibility, it is evident that these capabilities were more complexly                           
conceived than that of a hacktivist. Though the evidence is inconclusive, it is clear that from the                                 
76
very beginning Russia had an obvious political motive in rejecting the relocation of the Bronze                             
Soldier statue and  had firmly supported the rights of the ethnic Russian minority.  
Peter Pomerantsev, author of  Nothing is True and Everything is Possible: The Surreal                         
Heart of the New Russia,  states that “the Russian theory of war allows you to defeat the enemy                                   
without ever having to touch him.” This theory happens to fit together like a puzzle piece with                                 
the nature of cyber warfare, which also allows the perpetrator to conduct significant damage on a                               
system from any location, never having to face the consequences. Grassegger and Krogerus                         
express this perfectly by pointing out that cyber warfare is more than just a series of hacks and                                   
“cyber riots,” as some have called the Estonian incident, but “it is psychological manipulation,                           
executed with targeted digital information designed to weaken a country from within. Estonia                         
was an early experiment in that theory.”  Following the events that played out in Estonia, Russia                             
77
has applied similar tactics in subsequent cyberattacks in Kyrgyzstan and Georgia only a few                           
years later. Estonia was in a way the guinea pig ­ if an attack could be successful in Estonia, the                                       
most tech­based society on our planet, it could work anywhere in the world.  
Though no one has ever claimed direct responsibility for the attacks, there is some                           
speculation that the Russian youth group “Youth Movement, Ours!” may have been behind the                           







government computing centers or centers run by “Nashi su,” but no one has ever come forth to                                 
confirm or deny.  The Estonian government found great difficulty in convicting someone based                         
78
on the laws that existed at the time. Estonian laws of the period stated that “certain surveillance                                 
and investigation procedures of suspected crimes of a conviction would result in fewer than three                             
years’ imprisonment.” At the time, cybercrimes, including this attack, fell under this general law.                           
Even so, the Estonian government managed to convict and fine a 21 year old ethnic Russian                               
living in Tallinn, Dmitri Galushkevich, in relation to the DDoS attacks. He received no jail time                               
but was fined approximately $1,650 for blocking the website of Prime Minister Ansip’s political                           
party. This conviction highlighted the need for a rewriting of the Estonian penal code. The                             79
penal code was revised to encompass criminal offenses, specifically using computers, and added                         
sections to include offenses dealing with cyberattacks and cybercrime.  
Revising the penal code is not the only step that Estonia has taken since the attacks in                                 
order to confront the consequences of living in a heavily digital world. Not only was the incident                                 
important for Estonia to understand what steps needed to be taken concerning cyber security, but                             
it alerted other countries within the NATO alliance. In May 2008, Estonia along with Italy, Spain,                               
Slovakia, Germany, Lithuania, Latvia, and the Allied Command Transformation, called for the                       
establishment of a Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE), appropriately                     
located in Tallinn.  The establishment of the center is possibly the largest achievement by                           
80
Estonia, with the help of the world community, in response to the cyberattacks. With the                             







defense and security through training and public outreach, as well as research and development.                           
81
Each year, CCDCOE hosts “Locked Shields” in which member states come together for the                           
world’s largest cyberwar exercise. In addition, CCDCOE also has hosted several conferences and                         
symposiums such as the Cyber Conflict Legal and Policy Conference in September of 2009,                           
which explored cyber conflict management. By establishing this center in Tallinn as a cyber                           
82
hub and hosting annual events such as “Locked Shields”, Estonia has become the world leader                             
on cyber security issues ­ reaffirming its reputation as “E­Estonia.” In addition, in 2013 NATO                             
established a second research center specializing in strategic communications called StratCom in                       
Riga, Latvia, as well as a third center located in Helsinki, Finland focusing on “hybrid threats.”  
83
A second achievement in the wake of the 2007 cyber attacks is the  Tallinn Manual on                               
International Law Applicable to Cyber­warfare  written in 2009 by 20 security experts, legal                         
scholars and academics. The manual came to be a non­binding document, which addressed legal                           
questions surrounding digital conflict. The conclusion was drawn that “the definition of war                         
appears to function online in much the same way it does offline.” This manual has in a way                                   
84
become the language of international cyber law and has brought attention and awareness around                           
cybersecurity into the international realm. Just as the CCDCOE works towards tangible change                         
on the physical level, the  Tallinn Manual  has changed the conversation around cyber for at least                               
the next period of years. Hopefully, the  Tallinn Manual  can be a precursor of wider change on                                 










Part 2: The Russian-Georgian War (2008) 
Background 
The conflict in 2008 was focused on what is internationally recognized as the northern                           
Georgian territory of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and their separation from Georgia. South                         
Ossetia historically has had close ties with Russia, sharing a border with the Russian region of                               
North Ossetia. About 70,000 South Ossetians are neither ethnically Georgian or Russian but                         
rather are a distinctive ethnic community sharing a spoken language similar to Farsi. Due to the                               
close proximity to Russia, most South Ossetians hold Russian passports. With the ruble as the                             
main form of currency and receiving a $30 million annual budget, South Ossetia shares                           
significant economic ties with the Kremlin. Most importantly, Gazprom, Russia’s state­owned                     85
gas company, is immoderately invested in the region with gas pipeline infrastructure connecting                         
South Ossetia to Russia.  
History of the conflict  
The modern history of this conflict starts in 1991, when South Ossetians and Georgians                           
fought over the control of the region. Though South Ossetians appeared to have considerably less                             
military resources compared to Georgian forces, they received continual support from the                       
Russian government, which allowed the conflict to persist. In 1992, the sides reached a ceasefire                             
between both sides and South Ossetia was declared as an independent region within Georgia.                           
Following the establishment of South Ossetia as an independent region, an identical war was                           





reached establishing Abkhazia as an independent region of Georgia. To keep the peace between                           
South Ossetian separatists supported by Russia and Georgian troops, the Organization for                       
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) facilitated an agreement of peacekeeping forces                       
comprised of 500 Georgian, South Ossetian and Russian troops. Though officially an agreement                         
was reached in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both conflicts went largely ignored and                           
unresolved. Alison Lawlor Russel defines these conflicts as so­called “entropic conflicts that                       
have the capability to leave to progressive disorder and chaos, if not resolved of managed                             
effectively.” Even under the agreement reached with the help of OSCE, the South Ossetian                           86
capital of Tskhinvali fell victim to an increase in crime and corruption. 
Essential background  
The Georgian­Russian war was unique because it was the first time cyber attacks were                           
employed together with a large scale military invasion in the context of warfare. Unlike the                             
Estonian attacks, these cyber attacks clearly constituted part of what was an act of war. During                               
the invasion of Georgia, Russia was successful in invading the three traditional battlefields: air,                           
land, sea and using their cyber operations were able to invade Georgian cyberspace. The                           
Russians showcased that cyber can be easily implemented and synchronized with other                       
conventional methods of war enabling a more impactful form of warfare. While Estonia’s                         
internet is almost entirely independent and self­reliant, Georgia largely remains offline with                       
transportation and power not powered by the internet. In 2008, at the time of the conflict,                               
Georgia’s internet penetration rate stood at 8 internet users for every 100 people, showing a lack                               






internet infrastructure that does exist in Georgia is heavily dependent on Russia, with more than                             
half of its telecommunications routes traveling through Russian territory, making Georgia                     
extremely vulnerable, and allowing Russia the opportunity to easily manipulate Georgia’s                     
cyberspace. During the time of the conflict, Georgia was in the process of constructing a fiber                               
optic cable between Georgia and Bulgaria to minimize Russia’s influence over Georgia’s IT                         
infrastructure. In addition, Georgia is an important transit point for major oil and gas reserves                             88
bordering the Caspian Sea, one of the only few in the region outside of Russian control,                               
underlining its importance to the larger international market.  
From 2003, after Georgia’s Rose Revolution, relations between Russia and Georgia                     
remained sour. From the Russian perspective the United States had had an invisible hand in the                               
region to subvert Russia’s influence in the region. In 2005, Georgia released a National Strategic                             
Concept, which marked a change in identity shifting from a traditionally “South Caucasus                         
identity” to identify with a “European Black Sea identity,” as to align itself with the European                               
Union and NATO. Tensions rose between Russia and Georgia with the detonation of shared                           
electrical and gas pipelines located on the Russian side of the border. As a response, Russia                               
imposed embargoes and many ethnic Georgians were deported from Russian, as the Georgian                         
government  also deported Russian spies.   89
In Alison Lawlor Russel’s book  Cyber Blockades,  she notes that Russia’s support and                         
recognition for the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was a retaliatory move to                           
counter the world community’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence on February 17th in 2008.                         






Kosovo’s independence signals just another aspect of their continued hardline stance against                       
NATO and the European Union’s influence and the general culture of the West.   
Tensions between Russia and Georgia continued into April of 2008, as a Georgian                         
unarmed and unmanned aerial vehicle or UAV was shot down over the contested territory of                             
Abkhazia. Following the incident, the Abkhazian government stated that Georgia had violated                       
Abkhaz airspace claiming responsibility. In the following days, a video emerged which depicted                         
that in fact a Russian Mikoyan MiG­29 had shot down the Georgian UAV, and as a response                                 
Russia sent peacekeeping forces into Abkhazia to maintain peace. In late May, Russia sent in                             
additional troops to Abkhazia to repair a railway line, but Georgia took this as an act of                                 
aggression and as a part of a planned military intervention. In early July, violence in Abkhazia,                               
ongoing since April, spread to South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia with both sides building up                                 
military forces and in turn violating the terms of ceasefire.  90
The Attacks 
On July 19, 2008, a distributed denial­of­service, or DDoS attack flooded and shut down                           
Georgian servers and disabled the website of Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, for 24                         
hours. Though no one has ever claimed responsibility for the attacks, it was found that the botnet                                 
command­and­control server, also called a “bulletproof network” used in the attacks, was a                         91
so­called MachBot controller, which is often used by Russian bot herders. In addition, the                           92










information that could be traced to Russia. These July attacks became the petri dish for the                               
subsequent attacks and invasion of Georgia.  
The Georgian­Russian war started on August 7, 2008 when in response to Russian                         
aggression, Georgian troops drove into the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali. As a response,                           
Russian military forces also entered South Ossetia with airpower and infantry forces to                         
supposedly protect Russian peacekeepers in the region. Meanwhile, 8,000 Russian troops lined                       
the northern border between Georgia and Russia. Later evidence was found that before                         94
Georgian troops had started their offensive on Tskhinvali, Russian troops had already been                         
situating strategic military assets south of the Roki Tunnel, the official border between Georgia                           
and Russia. It is clear that Georgia’s seemingly absent 'aggression' did not warrant such a buildup                               
of military forces on the Russian side. There seems to be a clear difference in military might,                                 
constituting these early stages of the crisis as a clear form of asymmetric warfare.  
During the conventional military invasion, Russia and Georgia also engaged in                     
information warfare on both sides to try to defeat the enemy by other means. Georgia, like                               
Russia, shares a similar perspective of information warfare, viewing it as equally important to the                             
actions on the battlefield. As Lawlor Russel writes, “they engaged in attempts to control the                             
information available to the opposing side” to “justify their actions and gain approval in the                             
international scene and generate or maintain support for their military both at home and abroad.”                           
It is clear that Russia utilized this form of warfare as an extension of the physical battlefield to                                     95








information space. This also allowed Russia to control their response to the international                         
community and what information it chose or did not chose to take at face value.  
Cyberattacks were also utilized in conjunction with the ground and information assaults.                       
Several websites were found defaced, among them the Georgian president, Ministry of Foreign                         
Affairs and the National Bank of the Republic of Georgia. Posted to these websites were photos                               
of Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili and famous twentieth century dictators, including of                       
Adolf Hitler. It was found that a hacking group based in South Ossetia claimed responsibility for                               
the defacements. Though the defacements resulted in an inconvenience for the Georgian                       96
government, they did not cause any significant damage and therefore could be regarded as a                             
cyber riot or a form of online political protest.   
The defacements were not nearly as damaging as the DDoS attacks which crippled the                           
rest of Georgia. The DDoS attacks were launched at varying speeds, some of which, lasted                             
approximately two hours and some lasting up until six hours. Similar to the defacements the                             97
DDoS attacks were targeted at Georgian government websites, including the Parliament of the                         
Republic of Georgia, the president of the Republic of Georgia, the government of the                           
Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of                           
Georgia, and the governmental website in charge of administering standardized tests for students.                         
Furthermore, the websites of major communications and financial institutions were also targeted,                       
including  www.forum.ge , the largest forum based in Georgia,  www.civil.ge , the largest English                       
speaking Georgian news site, Associated Press, and other news sites. Other notable websites                         98







led by Garry Kasparov at the time. In the financial sector, the website of Georgia’s largest                               
commercial bank TBC was also attacked. In addition, the websites of the Supreme Court of                             
Georgia, various embassies including of the United States and United Kingdom based in Tbilisi                           
were also targeted. From the pattern of targeted websites, it is clear that none of the websites                                 99
were pro­Kremlin supported websites. All of the websites either supported Georgia, the                       
European Union, Russian opposition parties and English speaking sites, pointing to the fact that 
whoever was responsible for the attacks had a agenda in mind supported by an anti­Western                             
perspective ­­­ like that of the Kremlin.  
Implications  
Over the course of the attacks, which lasted from August 8th to the 10th coinciding with                               
the Russian offensive on the ground, 35 percent (over 100 internet networks) vanished from the                             
Georgian cyberspace. Approximately 60 percent of the compromised internet networks were                     
reported to be insecure at the time of the cyberattacks. The attacks originated from computers                             
found all over the world, which in technological terms means that several botnets were used, a                               
similar technique utilized in the Estonian cyber attacks of 2008. In Lawlor Russel’s research, she                             
notes that IT experts have noted that while the attacks on Georgia were meticulously planned                             
beforehand in coordination with the the on­ground offensive, in Estonia, coordinated was only                         
acknowledged later on after the second surge of attacks.  100
Similar to how terrorists post videos and instructions on how to build a bomb, it was                               
reported that Russian­language sites posted instructions on how to flood Georgian websites,                       






as a “cyber kill chain.” The primary two websites that were used in distributing these tutorials                               
were  xaker.ru and  stopgeorgia.ru , using a parallel site called  stopgeorgia.info . The  stopgeorgia.ru                       
website first became active in precise coordination with the on ground military offensive of                           
South Ossetia on August 7th. The interesting nature of the structure of the website allowed it                               
have a “bulletproof network” or a botnet command­and­control­server, which allowed users                     
more online freedom. If this website were traceable back to the Russian government then this                             101
would be another piece of evidence of how the Russian government manipulates the information                           
space in its favor to have control over what it perceives as the truth, and in an effort to influence                                       
other actors to think in the same way. Publishing these websites publicly online is also an                               
extension of Soviet strategy as well. The act of trying to recruit volunteer ‘soldiers’ to deface and                                 
disrupt these websites, if the publisher were the Russian government, displays a continuity                         
between the recruitment of volunteer soldiers for the Red Army; this time only for Russia’s                             
volunteer cyber army. The question still remains as to who uploaded this content to the public,                               
and did the Russian government play a part or did fellow hackers post the material?  
In remembering that most of Georgia’s telecommunications lines are routed through                     
Russian territory, at the time of the attacks Georgian internet traffic was routed through Russia,                             
subsequently denying Georgia the right to its own internet independence. Experts speculate that                         
due to the fact that the lines shared by Georgia and Russia are under the control of the Russian                                     
Business Network (RBN), there is a possibility that the RBN could have been the perpetrator of                               
the attacks. It also happens to be that RBN employs a large number of state sanctioned hackers                                 102






Belan, is currently on the FBI’s most wanted list, unrelated to the Georgian attacks, but for                               
conspiring in three massive data breaches of Yahoo spanning from 2013 up until its discovery in                               
2016.  
It is clear that by coordinating the cyber attacks and the offensive on the ground in the                                 
invasion of Georgia, was effective in limiting Georgia’s communication between the people and                         
the government and the government and the international community. A similar effect was seen                           
in the aftermath of the cyberattacks on Estonia. While the invasion of South Ossetia was a clear                                 
violation of Georgia’s territorial sovereignty, the cyber attacks in coordination with the                       
defacements can be considered a violation of Georgia’s internet sovereignty. The largest negative                         
effect of the cyber attacks was the fact that the people of Georgia were unable to access official                                   
government websites and media reporting of the waging war in South Ossetia, while at the same                               
time the Georgian government was unable to communicate with the rest of the world community,                           
which destabilized the governance of the state. In addition, on August 9, the National Bank of                                 103
Georgia was attacked by cyber attacks terminating all online banking services, which lasted a full                             
10 days. Due to the nature of military invasions, during which time economic damages are                             104
difficult measure, in Georgia it was ever more difficult to determine the economic losses due to                               
the incorporation of information and cyber warfare.  105
International response to attacks  
RUSSIA 
The Russian Embassy based in London, released a statement stating they had no                         







South Ossetia as a supposed “peace enforcement” operation. Meanwhile, the Kremlin also                       
released a statement that said it had no involvement in the attacks on Georgia. This response                               106
from both the Russian Embassy and the Russian government came as no surprise, especially                           
following the attacks on Estonia from a year before where the Russian government also had                             
adamantly claimed no involvement.  
IT experts on the other hand have asserted that though there is no conclusive evidence of                               
the Russian government’s connection to the attacks, there appears to be some proof that the                             
Russian Business Network could have had a hand in the attacks. They do however assert that the                                 
RBN may not have administered the attacks but instead may have accommodated the                         
“bulletproof networks” in a coordinated effort. Though there is not enough sufficient evidence                         107
to prove that the Russian government had a direct involvement in the attacks, the Kremlin did at                                 
least tolerate and support the attacks, considering the attacks were spent in a clear side­by­side                             
planning with the Russian military forces invading South Ossetia.  
Project Grey Goose, now formally called GreyLogic, was launched in 2008 as a response                           
to the cyber attacks on Georgia to investigate how the cyber war was waged in Georgia and if the                                     
Russian government played any involvement in the attacks. According to Project Grey Goose,                         
the cyber attacks appeared to possibly have been facilitated by an organization observing                         
different phases of the attacks. Lawlor writes that the first stage involved “encouraging                         108
activists to become involved in the cyber war against Georgia,” secondly “publishing a list of                             












The findings Project Grey Goose presents are compelling because surrounding the literature                       
discussing Russia’s connection to the hacker community, often times scholars and researchers                       
have not wanted to definitively assert that a relationship exists, due to the fact that the sparse                                 
evidence that is available is not enough to draw a definitive conclusion. On the other hand,                               
Project Grey Goose suggests a different option in which there may have previously existed a                             
relationship, but in the process of severing those ties the Russian government chooses not                           
condemn the actions of these individuals, but instead provide them with a space to function                             
without any circumstances, therefore tolerating their presence and maintaining their own desired                       
level of plausible deniability. It’s a “win­win” situation in which both sides benefit and therefore                             
both rely on one another for mutual protection.  
THE EUROPEAN UNION 
As mentioned earlier, Georgia is not a member state of the European Union, instead its                             
relationship with the European Union is facilitated by the Partnership and Cooperation                       
Agreement (PCA). President Sarkozy, at the time, the president of the European Union, brokered                           
a ceasefire on August 12, 2008. When Russia refused to withdraw its troops, as a part of the                                   111







the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, while also not renewing the partnership                         
between Europe and Russia until troops were withdrawn. The lack of unity between member                           112
states meant that the European Union had lost an opportunity to formulate a definitive response                             
to the war, which would have more effective in countering Russia’s aggression. The European                           
Union receives one third of its oil from Russia as well as 40 percent of its natural gas, therefore                                     
any action that the E.U. decided to take, would have to have been seriously considered noting                               
their energy dependency on Russia. Though the European Union struggled coming to a                         
consensus, member states were able to provide financial aid to Georgia. The E.U. added 120                             
million euros in post­crisis assistance to its usual 42 million euros, and in addition individual                             
E.U. member states provided 8.4 million euros for additional support.   113
NATO 
Though Georgia was not a member state, at the time NATO had opened up discussions on                               
admitting Georgia. Georgia remains a NATO partner, having participated in NATO missions in                         
Afghanistan in the past. NATO, like the E.U., was very concerned about Russia’s actions and                             
invasion of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, highlighting the “disproportionate use of force.”                       114
NATO also sent in experts to assess damage specifically to civil infrastructure, and stressed its                             
recognition of Georgia’s sovereignty “within its internationally recognized borders,” including                   
South Ossetia and Abkhazia as Georgian territory. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the NATO secretary                           







nothing that the E.U. had provided too many “concessions to Russia and not opposing Russian                             
violation of the agreement.”    115
Though Lawlor Russel presents a very precise and accurate retelling of the cyber attacks                           
and invasion of Georgia in 2008, there are some important factors missing from the way she                               
chooses to discuss Russia’s approach to cyber and information warfare. In Lawlor Russel’s                         
retelling she seems to assume that information warfare and cyber warfare are separate entities,                           
the position often taken by the West, as a result her account of the Georgian war is largely from                                     
the perspective of the West. I believe she does not stress enough how groundbreaking the                             
strategic implementation of cyber, in conjunction with on ground operations, over the course of                           
the war, was vital to the actualization and development of Russian military doctrine in 2010 and                               
then again in 2014. It is important to stress, once again, that Russia approaches both forms of                                 
warfare as integrated systems, emphasizing Russia’s approach as an entirely different from the                         
West. Therefore this is a new way of waging warfare for the West but it is a strategy associated                                     
with asymmetric and hybrid warfare familiar to Russia that has been employed in the past, which                               
only recently has become more visible in the attacks on Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine.   
____ 
Part 3: The Ukrainian War (2014) 
Essential Background  
Over the course of the past four years, war has continued to disrupt the civil society of                                 
Ukraine, even as the media has moved on to cover the next attractive crisis. Often times, it is                                   





agreement gone wrong. Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych had promised that he would sign                         
a trade agreement with the European Union, which would have been a monumental achievement                           
in an effort to solidify ties with the E.U. Instead President Yanukovych adjourned talks with the                               
E.U. due to the strong dissent of the Kremlin, which had had a history of opposing Ukraine’s                                 
interest in joining and forming a closer relationship with the E.U. On November 21, 2013,                             
thousands upon thousands of protestors took to the streets in reaction to the presidential decision,                             
emphasizing the increasing divide between the pro­European west and those in support of                         
Yanukovych’s pro­Kremlin government.   116
History of the conflict: The Annexation of Crimea   
On February 20, 2014, after months of low level violence, a violent gunfight erupted in                             
Maidan Square (or independence square in Kiev) leaving dozens dead. This incident sparked                         
reactions from the protesters who claimed that government snipers were planted and instructed to                           
kill protestors, whereas the government claimed that opposition leaders were to blame for                         
provoking the violence. Just two days later on February 22, Yanukovych’s guards abandoned                         
their posts at the president’s compound and Yanukovych conveniently fled. In the meantime, the                           
former Prime Minister of Ukraine, Yulia Tymoshenko, jailed since 2011 after a politically driven                           
trial, was also released and consequently addressed the pro­Western protesters in Maidan Square                         
as an attempt to rally support, confidence and hope. Similar to protests during the Arab Spring in                                 
Cairo, and even Occupy Wall Street in New York City, protestors occupied Maidan Square day                             







Only a week later on March 1st, the Russian parliament confirmed President Putin’s                         
appeal to deploy Russian military forces into Crimea, a region of southern Ukraine that has a                               
large population of ethnic Russians and politically pro­Kremlin. After the confirmation of the                         
Russian parliament, thousands of so­called ‘little green men’ in unmarked uniforms invaded the                         
peninsula of Crimea bordering Russia. In only two weeks, Russia had successfully annexed                         
Crimea in an extremely controversial referendum heavily opposed by many in western Ukraine                         
and the international community. Subsequently, on April 15, the Kiev government launched its                         
first military operation against the pro­Russian rebels who had seized government buildings                       
across eastern Ukraine, and a month later separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk already had                           
declared independence following unrecognized referendums.  118
On May 25th, Petro Poroshenko, a candy magnate and one of Ukraine’s richest men, was                             
elected into office, meanwhile reports emerged that pro­Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine                       
had engaged in voter suppression to change the results of the election. After months of violence,                               
the same deal which former President Yanukovych had adjourned abruptly before fleeing due to                           
backlash, on June 27th President Poroshenko successfully signed the E.U. Association                     
Agreement, sending a message to Russia that Ukraine was still seeking to maintain a relationship                             
with the European Union. Over a month later, on June 17th, the commercial airliner Malaysia                             
Airlines Flight 17 went down above rebel­held territory in eastern Ukraine and all 298 people on                               
board died. It was later discovered that the airliner was shot down by a surface­to­air missile                               







Months later on September 20th, a complete ceasefire was finally reached between                       
Ukraine and the pro­Russian separatists, which stated that both sides must back down militarily,                           
while Russian caravans of trucks were discovered crossing the Russian­Ukraine border                     
supposedly for humanitarian aid. On November 12th, a NATO commander revealed that in fact                           
Russia had not retrieved from the Ukrainian border, instead had continued providing the rebels                           
with the means to continue to wage the conflict, violating the September ceasefire — which                             
Moscow also denied. This fact highlights the asymmetric nature of the Ukrainian war, as well as                               
another point on the continuum between Soviet and Russian military strategie. 
Starting with the new year, on January 22, 2015, the Donetsk International Airport in                           
eastern Ukraine finally fell to the separatist rebels, and a few days later, President Poroshenko                             
called for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate “crimes against humanity” due to                           
the increasing dire situation in eastern Ukraine. A month later, Angela Merkel and Francois                           
Hollande advocated for another ceasefire agreement after the United States proposed supplying                       
the Kiev government with lethal aid. After the ceasefire went into affect on February 12th,                             
Ukraine’s National Defense and Security Council reported that there had already been instances                         
of 300 violations of the ceasefire by February 20th. On June 22, seeing that the ceasefire was not                                   
productive in alleviating the conflict, foreign ministers of the E.U collectively imposed sanctions                         
against Russian in response to Russia’s military aggression over the past months, to which the                             
Russian government responded calling them “unfounded and illegal.”  120
Nearly a year later, on March 3rd, 2016, the United Nations released its own statement                             





Since April 2015, approximately 9,500 people had been killed in the ongoing conflict while                           
22,100 more injured, according to the UN. On August 5th, the Office of the UN High                               
Commissioner for Human Rights released factual data depicting a rise in civilian casualties,                         
specifically in eastern Ukraine. The agency found that 69 civilians were found dead in June ­­­                               
the highest death toll since August 2015. Later in December, the Ukrainian military conducted                           
missile launches near the Crimean border, to which Russia immediately countered stating that it                           
was in violation of international agreements. Russia viewed the missile launches as a threat to                             
their border security recognizing Crimea as Russian territory after the annexation. Meanwhile,                       
the international community recognized the missile tests as lawful under existing international                       
agreements due to recognizing the territorial sovereignty of Crimea and eastern Ukraine as                         
Ukrainian sovereignty.   121
“Operation Armageddon”  
Published in 2015, midst the attacks against Ukraine, Lookinggglass Cyber Threat                     
Intelligence Group, proposed research on Russian cyber warfare targeted against Ukraine titled                       
Operation Armageddon: Cyber Espionage as a Strategic Component of Russian Modern                     
Warfare.  The research speculates that the so­called “Operation Armageddon” (originally                   
misspelled as “Armagedon”) had been already active since 2013, siting clear prior planning on                           
the part of the Russian government. The goal of using cyber to achieve Russia’s objectives was                               
to “provide a military advantage to Russian leadership by targeting Ukrainian government, law                         
enforcement, and military officials in order to steal information that can provide insight into near                             






with Ukraine’s decision to sign the European Union Association Agreement on June 27th.                         
Though that Russia may have already been preparing for this attacks as early as 2012 in                               
preparation for the possibility that Ukraine would sign the agreement. The earliest timestamp of                           
malware stated the date June 26, 2013 after which more timestamps were found also correlating                             
with the 10th Yalta Annual Meeting between August 12 and September 16th of 2013. The annual                               
meeting attended by 250 leaders from 20 countries was meant to draw attention to the future of                                 
Ukraine, which may have been the “catalyst” for Russia to implement its cyber operations due to                               
the threat of Ukraine closing ties with the European Union. Lookingglass does note that the                             
attacks increased in the aftermath of Yanukovych fleeing his compound in on February 22, 2014                             
and the interim government announcing the beginning of an “anti­terrorist operation” against the                         
pro­Russian separatists. From that point forward the attacks became ceaseless, again in                       
coordination with Russia’s military actions on the ground, similar to Russia’s military strategy in                           
the Georgian­Russian war, from which Russia definitely learned was an effective strategy for                         
obtaining information and intelligence, and therefore gaining leverage.  
Lookingglass found that according to statements made by the Security Service of Ukraine                         
(SBU), the attacks were administered by the 16th (formerly known as the Federal Agency of                             
Government Communications and Information) and 18th Centers of the Russian FSB. As                       
opposed to the attacks in Georgia, where it was inconclusive if the FSB was involved in                               
administering the attacks, this was the first time throughout all three case studies that the Russian                               




the Russian government was actively implementing cyber warfare and espionage as a part of                           
their military strategy in the Ukrainian war.   123
In the section of their research focused around the tactics used in Operation Armageddon,                           
Lookingglass reported a pattern in the attacks starting with the dispersal of targeted                         
spear­phishing emails a strategy not used in either Estonia or Georgia, siting a new form of                               
attack developed by Russia. These emails arrived in inboxes disguised as documents originating                         
from Ukrainian officials, often directly stolen from the very officials, to convince the user to                             
open the infected content. Some of the so­called “payloads” came disguised also as updates for                             
Adobe Flash Player, Internet Explorer or Google Chrome. In addition, some payloads over the                           
course of the operation were forms of RAT, a type of malware that has the ability to control a                                     
system through a remote network connection. In the case of Ukraine, specifically a Remote                           
Manipulator System was used, which according to Lookingglass is a common RAT used by                           
Russian hacking forums, and has been classified by the AntiVirus industry as malicious. The way                             
these RATs were used to obtain information during the Ukrainian­Russian war were then able to                             
be used later as ‘lures,’ in a sense building on top of one another. The conflict on the ground                                     
together with the momentum of the cyber attacks and RATs may have been the reason why the                                 
attacks last over the course of many years, rather than just a few weeks or days, therefore                                 
proving to be more effective as the attacks in Estonia and Georgia. It is clear based off of                                   
Lookingglass’ research that the attacks on Ukraine were purely for Russia to have a military                             







The Ukrainian war demonstrated, more so than Estonia and Georgia, that cyber warfare                         
and the ‘little green men’ are linked as a part of Clausewitz’ approach to consolidating all aspects                                 
of the state. Ukraine displayed the level in which the Russian military was able to dominate all of                                   
Ukraine’s domains including land, sea, air, space by having foremost control of the information                           
space. While in Estonia, cyber was used to disrupt internet activity, in Georgia this strategy was                               
used side­by­side with the military invasion, ultimately all of these strategies culminated in using                           
cyber warfare to gain intelligence and leverage over on ground Ukrainian military forces. This                           
leveraging of information is an indicator of the direction in which Russian military strategy will                             
take moving forward. Rather than implement cyber when necessary, as case­by­case, like the                         
United States, Ukraine is evidence of the fact that Russia is aiming for cyber warfare to have an                                   

























I first set forth to examine the effect of Russian cyber warfare on the Baltic states, as I                                   
had lived and worked recently in Latvia, the country of my ancestors. After the 2016 U.S.                               
presidential elections, I quickly realized Russia’s targeted use of cyber warfare was not specific                           
to the Baltic region, but affected the whole post­Soviet bloc. In studying the 2008 cyber attacks                               
on Estonia, I found that Georgia and Ukraine shared very similar experiences, and therefore                           
determined to concentrate on Russia’s offensive use of cyber for the purpose of maintaining its                             
sphere of influence in the area of the former Soviet bloc. While I had initially intended to study                                   
Russia’s manipulation of proxy actors as a volunteer “cyber army,” I became fascinated by the                             
influence of Soviet military doctrine on Russia’s current use of cyber warfare. 
The goal of this paper was to examine how Russian military strategy has been able to                               
include cyber attacks into the umbrella term of information warfare. The continuity between                         
Russian and Soviet military strategy can be seen by studying three components of this strategy:                             
the mobilization of the state, the offense­defense balance (or imbalance, in the case of Russia),                             
and the role of Soviet partisan warfare as the basis for later use of asymmetric and hybrid                                 
warfare. 
In the Soviet era, the mobilization of the state was meant to protect the Revolution within                               
the confines of the Union, and later to prepare the state for war. One can say that mobilization is                                     
now embodied in the information space itself. By manipulating cyber space to have it take                             
control of the functions, and, most importantly, the discourse of other sectors of governance, it                             




cases of Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine, in which the inflicted cyber attacks all had an effect on                                 
the communications in the three countries during the time of the attacks, affecting how the                             
governments could communicate with their people and with the outside world. 
Similarly, the offense­defense balance has played a very significant role in the                       
development of Soviet military strategy. The Soviet regime had difficulty actualizing this balance                         
in its doctrine before the onset of World War II. As a result, what was supposed to be a balance                                       
became an imbalance favoring the offense over the defense. The emphasis on offense both aided                             
and inhibited the creation of Soviet military strategy. One way in which it aided Russian military                               
strategy was that it facilitated the inclusion of cyber into the total doctrine. Russia has embraced                               
an almost entirely offensive military strategy well into the 21 st century, a fact which is evident in                                 
the three case studies outlined in this project. 
Lastly, partisan warfare, originally inspired by the peasant and proletarian uprisings                     
during the Soviet era, has evolved into the asymmetric and hybrid forms of warfare of today.                               
This can be traced from Soviet military history, beginning as far back as World War I, and                                 
continuing throughout World War II, a strategy often due to limited resources and supplies. Now                             
in modern strategy, this method of waging war and conflict has continued to develop, partly due                               
to the fact that asymmetric and hybrid warfare work well hand­in­hand with cyber, which favors                             
the offensive. The conflicts described in all three case studies can be categorized either as                             
asymmetric or as hybrid warfare, or as both – supporting the conclusion that Russia’s use of                               
cyber warfare is an extension of asymmetric and hybrid methods. 
In the future, I hope to expand upon this project and to study Russia’s alleged use of a                                   




display yet another point of continuity between the Soviet and Russian military doctrines. In                           
researching Russia’s form of cyber warfare, I have found the literature to be very vague and                               
non­specific in identifying the role of the Russian government as an actor in international cyber                             
aggression. 
I believe that it is high time for Russia’s use of cyber warfare to be fully disclosed to the                                     
Russian people and to the world community. My personal – not academic – goal when beginning                               
this project was to do just that. In the process, I became overwhelmed by the plethora of                                 
literature on the topic, and hindered by the fact that I am neither a coder nor a Russian speaker. I                                       
believe that Russia’s use of cyber warfare is important, not because Russian is the only actor that                                 
engages in cyber warfare, but because Russia’s use of cyber warfare is so opaque. Its methods                               
allow the Russian government to act under the radar, knowing they will receive little or no                               
condemnation, or at least scrutiny, by the international community – creating an efficient form of                             
aggression that in my eyes is quite dangerous for the United States and the world. 
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